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TRANSATLANTIC PRIVACY REGULATION: 
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 
FRANCESCA BIGNAMI* 
GIORGIO RESTA** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Regulatory differences in the data privacy arena have been a recurring source 
of contention in transatlantic trade relations. In the 1990s, the focus was primarily 
on differences in the rules governing market actors. Over the past decade, 
however, the focus has expanded to include the public sector and the policies 
regulating the collection and use of personal data by government actors, 
particularly national security agencies. This article surveys the considerable 
history of transatlantic relations in the privacy area and the attempts that have 
been made to reconcile legal and policy differences in the interest of trade 
liberalization and police and national security cooperation. It then turns to the 
current dispute over National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance and discusses 
the factual and legal underpinnings of the dispute. The article demonstrates how 
this latest episode in transatlantic privacy both underscores longstanding legal 
differences and reveals fresh ones. The article concludes with observations 
regarding the impact of the NSA dispute on transatlantic privacy relations and on 
trade relations more broadly speaking. 
II 
HISTORY OF DATA PRIVACY IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 
A. Regulatory Differences and Similarities 
In narrating the history of data privacy, the point of departure is generally 
taken to be the Code of Fair Information Practices set forth in an expert report 
commissioned by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
and published in 1973.1 To understand the current transatlantic dispute, however, 
it bears taking one step back, to begin with the judgment of the German 
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Constitutional Court in the Microcensus case. In 1969, the Court found that the 
personal information collected in large data banks was constitutionally protected 
under Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law (human dignity and the free development 
of personality).2 That litigation involved a challenge to the federal census, which 
the Court ultimately upheld, but only on condition that the information remain 
anonymous.3 This early case was followed, over ten years later, by the celebrated 
Census Act case in which the Court recognized a broad “right of informational self-
determination (“informationelles Selbstbestimmungsrecht”).4 With the right of 
informational self-determination, the Court significantly extended its earlier 
jurisprudence. The Court recognized that the right of informational self-
determination covered all personal information, and it abandoned the distinction 
that had been made in the Microcensus case between private information and 
information in the public domain. The Court also stated that the right came into 
being at the time of collection—at the moment that the individual was asked to 
give up the information—and not simply once it was used or misused by state 
actors and other types of data processors. 
The extraordinary possibilities of modern information technologies 
underpinned this conceptualization of the right of informational self-
determination. In language reminiscent of a recent report by the United States 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,5 the German Court wrote in 1983 that 
[t]he [individual’s decisional] authority needs special protection in view of the present 
and prospective conditions of automatic data processing. It is particularly endangered 
because . . . the technical means of storing highly personalized information about 
particular persons today are practically unlimited, and [information] can be retrieved in 
a matter of seconds with the aid of automatic data processing, irrespective of distance. 
Furthermore, such information can be joined to other data collections—particularly 
when constructing integrated information systems—to produce a partial or virtually 
complete personality profile, with the person concerned having insufficient means of 
controlling either its veracity or its use.6 
In the Census Act case, the Court also expanded on the test that applies to all 
measures that interfere with basic rights, including privacy.  Generally speaking, 
any interference with one of the rights protected under the Basic Law must be 
authorized by parliamentary law, serve a legitimate purpose, and satisfy the 
proportionality test, i.e. suitability, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu.7 In 
the case of the right of informational self-determination, the Court further 
 
 2.  Microcensus Case, 27 BVerfGE 1 (1969), translated and reprinted in DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL 
A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 356–58 (3d ed. 2012). 
 3.  See generally id. 
 4.  Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1, Dec. 15, 1983, translated and reprinted in DONALD P. KOMMERS & 
RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 408–09 (3d ed. 
2012). 
 5.  PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED 
UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014) [hereinafter REPORT ON USA PATRIOT ACT]. 
 6.  Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1 (1983), supra note 4, at 409. 
7 DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 67 (3d ed. 2012). 
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specified that the legislative basis for personal data processing must be clear and 
precise and that, to satisfy proportionality, there must be organizational and 
procedural safeguards capable of preventing infringements of the right8 
This constitutional frame has shaped both the jurisprudence of other 
constitutional courts—in particular the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)—as well as positive 
lawmaking in Germany and at the European level. Both the ECtHR and the 
European Court of Justice have recognized that the right to privacy, guaranteed 
under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, covers personal data 
and is triggered whenever public or private entities gather information that can be 
associated with an individual.9 Both courts use the same the jurisprudential 
framework of (1) a basis in law, (2) clearly defined, legitimate purposes, and (3) 
proportionality to analyze data-protection challenges, as will be discussed in 
connection with NSA surveillance. 
In the legislative sphere, the fundamental right to data privacy has shaped the 
design of data-protection legislation in most European jurisdictions. Within 
Germany, the Court’s first judgment in the Microcensus case provided much of the 
impetus for the first federal data-protection law. A small coalition party, the Free 
Democratic Party, took on the issue of new technologies and democracy, and, 
drawing on the case and the work of a number of prominent legal scholars, pressed 
for privacy legislation.10 A government bill was introduced in May 1973, and after 
a long series of parliamentary debates, mostly centered on the extent of private-
sector coverage and the design of the enforcement system, a federal law was finally 
passed in January 1977.11 That law—together with a series of sectoral laws specific 
to areas such as telecommunications and the police—served as the 
constitutionally required legislative act authorizing the interference with the right 
to privacy. The law set down the conditions for the use and sharing of personal 
information, most of which turned on the proportionality requirement that the 
data processor handle the information only insofar as “necessary” to accomplish 
the original purpose of the data operation.12 Further, it established a legal 
 
8.    Id. at 410–11. 
 9.  See, e.g., Amann v. Switzerland, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 843, 858 (2000).  Since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the right to privacy is protected under Article 7 of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the right to personal data protection is recognized specifically under Article 8 of 
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
 10.  See, e.g., ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN, PROTECTORS OF PRIVACY: REGULATING PERSONAL DATA IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 51–52, 63–69 (2008) (describing the role of Free Democratic Party); Klaus Flachmann, 
Kreditwirtschaft und Datenschutz, 26 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DAS GESAMTE KREDITWESEN 56 (1973) (noting and 
criticizing role of legal academics and the theoretical tenor of the policy debates); Spiros Simitis, Chancen 
un Gefahren der elektronischen Datenverarbeitung, 16 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 673, 675, (1971) 
(providing an example of legal scholarship); Steinmuller/Lutterbeck/Mallmann/Harbort/Kolb/Schneider, 
Grundfragen des Datenschutze Gutachten im Auftrag des Bundesmnisteriums des Innern, July 1971 (BT-
Drucksache VI/3826) (legal scholarship). 
 11.  COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE 
UNITED STATES 77–90 (1992); DAVID FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 22–24 (1989). 
 12.  Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], 1977. 
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framework for oversight and enforcement.13 
The Court’s second judgment in the Census Act case also triggered 
parliamentary action, resulting in a series of amendments to the federal data-
protection law in 1990.14 In line with that case, some of the amendments were 
designed to extend privacy rights to the entire gamut of data processing activities: 
for instance, in the public sector, the collection of personal data—not simply the 
storage and use of personal data—was regulated for the first time.15 Other 
amendments were designed to improve enforcement of the right: the 
independence of the Federal Data Protection Commissioner was improved,16 state 
authorities acquired new enforcement powers,17 individuals were expressly given 
the right to vindicate their privacy rights in court, and the rules on proving 
damages were relaxed for lawsuits brought against both private and public 
bodies.18 
Turning to the positive law at the European level, both the Council of Europe 
Convention 108 (Convention 108) and the EU Data Protection Directive were 
shaped by the rights framework. This is particularly clear in the Directive, 
proposed in 1990 and adopted in 1995.19 Although the Directive was based on the 
market harmonization competence in the EC Treaty, designed to facilitate data 
flows and trade in Europe, it was essentially conceived as a measure that would 
improve protection of the fundamental right to privacy throughout Europe.20 The 
main proponents of the Directive were national data-protection officials with a 
mission to safeguard the right to privacy, and they ensured that the purpose, 
structure, and text of the Directive were rooted in the logic of rights.21 Thus the 
Directive declared as its object that the “member states shall protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right 
to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.”22 In line with the 
constitutional law on rights, the Directive serves as the law that authorizes the 
interference with the right to privacy implicated by any collection and use of 
personal information and, in accordance with the constitutional duty of clarity and 
precision, it sets down the exhaustive list of purposes for which such interference 
is allowed.23 And it satisfies the constitutional requirement of proportionality by 
limiting data processing to that which is necessary to accomplish the stated 
 
 13.  BDSG, 1977 §§ 17–42; BENNETT, supra note 11, at 180; FLAHERTY, supra note 11, at 25. 
 14.  BDSG, 1990. 
 15.  See id. at § 13. 
 16.  See id. at § 22(1). 
 17.  See id. at § 38(5). 
 18.  See id. at § 8. 
 19.  EP and Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
 20.  See Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case of the European 
Information Privacy Network, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 807, 834–44 (2005) [hereinafter Transgovernmental 
Networks]. 
 21.  See NEWMAN, supra note 10, at 74. 
 22. EP and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 19, art. 1. 
 23. Id. art. 7. 
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purpose and by establishing a set of organizational and procedural guarantees to 
protect against privacy violations.24 
Turning to the United States, there it is indeed appropriate to begin the 
historical account of data privacy with the Code of Fair Information Practices. This 
included a number of principles that remain prominent in contemporary privacy 
law: transparency in the use and processing of data; an individual right of access 
to and, if appropriate, correction of personal data; the duty (on the part of data 
users) to ensure the accuracy of personal data; the obligation to adopt security 
measures to prevent fraudulent uses of data; and a limitation on uses to the 
purposes for which the personal information was originally collected.25 The Fair 
Information Practices were adopted in the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 and in 
numerous sector-specific U.S. laws.26 When, in 1980, a set of data-protection 
guidelines was adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, a number of the American legal principles were included.27 These 
guidelines, in turn, influenced the negotiations on Convention 108.28 And today, 
they are reflected in national privacy regulation in Europe, which give prominence 
to transparency, access, accuracy, security, and use limitations. 
Even though widespread adoption of Fair Information Practices has produced 
significant convergence in this policy area, not only between the United States and 
Europe but among jurisdictions globally, the historical trajectory on the American 
side of the Atlantic has also followed a distinctive path that has generated 
regulatory conflict with Europe and has given rise to a series of diplomatic efforts 
to render the two systems compatible. The first significant difference was and 
continues to be the absence of constitutionalization of the policy area. Even though 
the periodic expert reports that have been commissioned in response to public 
concern over information technologies have generally canvassed the 
constitutional law in the domain of privacy and have underscored the importance 
of privacy for liberal values, they have all stopped short of recognizing that there 
is, or should be, a constitutional right to data privacy.29 The failure to reach such a 
conclusion is understandable because the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not 
squarely support such a conclusion. All of the older cases suggest that such a right 
does not exist,30 and even though the most recent decisions of the Court in the area 
indicate that the tide might be turning in light of the dramatic developments that 
have occurred in digital technologies, there still does not appear to be a solid 
 
 24. See Francesca Bignami, Cooperative Legalism and the Non-Americanization of European Regulatory 
Styles:  The Case of Data Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 411, 435–41 (2011) [hereinafter Cooperative Legalism]. 
 25.  RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, supra note 1, at 33–46. 
 26.  DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 655–60 (2009). 
 27.  See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t 
Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 8. 
 28.  See COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 75 (2003). 
 29.  For recent examples, see generally LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 
(2013) [hereinafter LIBERTY AND SECURITY]; REPORT ON USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 5. 
 30.  See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
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majority in favor of a constitutional right to data privacy.31 
The second difference, related to the first, is the more limited safeguards for 
privacy in positive law. This is evident across a number of legislative enactments 
and, to use the constitutional framework described earlier, takes two primary 
forms. First, the substantive limits on collection, use, sharing, and retention of data 
that are loosely connected to the proportionality requirement of necessity are 
generally more relaxed in the United States than in Europe.32 To grossly 
oversimplify, in U.S. law, more information—from the collection phase to the 
erasure phase—is generally viewed as better than less information. Therefore, 
although U.S. and European law share similar commitments to transparency of 
databases, access to and correction of one’s personal data, reliability of personal 
information, and digital security, U.S. law contains fewer restrictions on how much 
personal data may be collected, how such data may be used, and how long that 
data may be kept. Second, in the United States, the enforcement of privacy law is 
largely entrusted to private litigants and courts, not administrative agencies. This 
is especially true for privacy regulation of the public sector, which lacks a powerful 
set of administrative overseers comparable to European data-protection 
authorities.33 The importance of courts, as opposed to administrative agencies, in 
the U.S. regulatory scheme has undermined public oversight because of the 
difficulty of analogizing privacy harms to traditional torts and the many doctrinal 
obstacles this has created for litigants seeking redress through the courts.34 
To illustrate briefly the more limited statutory safeguards for privacy under 
U.S law, compare the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 with the Council of Europe’s 
Convention 108. The Privacy Act regulates the government’s collection, use, and 
disclosure of all types of personal information. It contains the familiar 
transparency, access and correction, reliability, and security principles. However, 
there are relatively few substantive limits on what can be done with personal 
information. Agencies can collect any personal information that is relevant and 
necessary to the agency’s legal purposes set down by congressional statute or 
presidential executive order.35 The only type of personal information that requires 
special justification to be collected is personal data “describing how any individual 
exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment [right to freedom of 
expression and freedom of association]”36 as opposed to the numerous categories 
of information considered to be sensitive in Convention 108, including racial 
 
 31.  See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012). 
 32.  See, e.g., FRANCESCA BIGNAMI, THE US LEGAL SYSTEM ON DATA PROTECTION IN THE FIELD OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT:  SAFEGUARDS, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES FOR EU CITIZENS 36 (2015) [hereinafter BIGNAMI, THE US 
LEGAL SYSTEM], 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519215/IPOL_STU(2015)519215_EN.pdf
. 
 33.  Cooperative Legalism, supra note 24, at 419. 
 34.  Francesca Bignami, European versus American Liberty: A Comparative Analysis of Antiterrorism 
Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 684–86 (2007) [hereinafter European versus American Liberty]. 
 35.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (2012). 
 36.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7). 
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origin, criminal convictions, and health information.37  Although the Privacy Act 
generally prohibits sharing with other government agencies without the consent 
of the individual involved, it makes a broad exception for “routine uses” disclosed 
to the public at the time the record system is created.38 In contrast with the 
Convention, which says that personal data shall be “preserved in a form which 
permits identification of the data subjects for no longer than is required for the 
purposes for which those data are stored,”39 the Privacy Act contains no provision 
regulating the length of data retention. Last, in the case of intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies, most of these substantive requirements can be avoided if, 
at the time that legal notice of the database is given (part of the transparency duty), 
the agency claims the exemptions available under the Act.40 On the question of 
oversight, the Privacy Act confines enforcement to litigation and the courts: it gives 
individuals the right to sue the government for damages and, in some instances, to 
receive injunctive relief.41 Government officials may also be criminally prosecuted 
for certain violations of the Privacy Act.42 Although the original bill would have 
established an independent commission tasked with enforcement, similar to the 
model that took root in Europe in the 1970s, it was removed in the end as part of 
the compromise necessary to pass the Privacy Act.43 
The third significant transatlantic difference that emerged early on and that 
persists still today is the absence, in the United States, of a comprehensive, privacy 
law applicable to the private sector. Like an independent commission, regulation 
of the private sector was proposed in the early days of the policy area: the original 
version of the Privacy Act would have regulated personal data processing in both 
the public and private sectors.44 The Watergate scandal, however, was fresh in the 
minds of lawmakers, and the prospect of a government Big Brother was their 
principal fear.45 For their part, industry groups and many privacy experts 
successfully opposed comprehensive privacy regulation on the grounds that it was 
too early to discern which kinds of privacy problems would emerge in the private 
sector.46 They also argued that the diverse circumstances of various economic 
sectors would be handled best in tailored, sector-specific statutes rather than in a 
cross-cutting piece of legislation.47 Therefore, even though privacy statutes have 
been enacted to regulate a wide array of market sectors—banking, 
telecommunications, health care, credit reporting, and so on—there is no single 
 
 37.  See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, no. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981), art. 6 [hereinafter Convention 108]. 
 38.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3). 
 39.  Convention 108, supra note 37, art. 5e. 
 40.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)–(k). 
 41.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(g). 
 42.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(i). 
 43.  See S. 3148, 93d Cong. (1974) (original version with privacy commission); Privacy Act of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (version without privacy commission); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY 
ACT OF 1974 at 119–24 (1976),  http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LH_privacy_act-1974.pdf. 
 44.  S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 201 (1974). 
 45.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, supra note 43, at 4, 832, 893. 
 46.  See, e.g., id. at 68. 
 47.  S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 19–20 (1974). 
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omnibus law capable of capturing the data practices, sectors, and emerging 
technologies that fall in between the cracks of the individual statutes.48 
B. Regulatory Conflict and Cooperation 
Although many aspects of European and U.S. privacy regulation are being 
debated at present and may change in the near future, the deep-seated differences 
analyzed in the previous section are unlikely to disappear anytime soon and are 
vital to understanding the regulatory conflicts and attempts at harmonization of 
the past twenty years. Conflict with the United States has involved largely the 
European Union as opposed to individual member states. When privacy regulation 
first became a salient issue in transatlantic relations, in the mid-1990s, attention 
was mostly focused on the private sector and market actors. By the mid-2000s, 
however, U.S. government actors also came under scrutiny for their use of 
personal data to screen for suspected security threats as well as related criminal 
offenses. The following narrates both sets of disputes through to the revelations of 
NSA surveillance in summer 2013. 
1. Regulation of the Market: Safe Harbor 
The divergent U.S. and EU approaches to privacy regulation first emerged as a 
salient problem and a potential threat to transatlantic trade in the mid-1990s. Like 
many of the early national data-protection laws that had preceded it, the 1995 EU 
Directive contained a blocking provision that required national authorities to 
prohibit data transfers to jurisdictions without adequate privacy guarantees.49 In 
view of the lack of comprehensive marketplace regulation in the United States, U.S. 
firms with European operations feared that the U.S. legal framework would not be 
considered adequate and that, as a result, data transfers from Europe to the United 
States would be deemed illegal.50 In response, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
initiated negotiations with the European Commission and the two sides reached 
an agreement on “Safe Harbor” privacy principles that, if adopted by U.S. 
organizations, would entitle those organizations to a presumption of “adequacy” 
under the Directive.51 The Safe Harbor agreement took effect in 2000, as did the 
Commission decision granting those firms that adhered to the Safe Harbor 
principles an adequacy finding.52 Under the Safe Harbor agreement, the legal basis 
for collecting and using personal information is consent. Consent is assured by 
giving the consumer “notice” of personal data practices and by allowing the 
consumer “choice” respecting disclosures to third parties and uses of personal 
 
 48.  Examples of sector-specific statutes include the Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630 
(1978), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012), and the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 49.  EP and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 19, arts. 25–26. 
 50.  See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules 
in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 69–79 (2000). 
 51.  See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 
45666-01 (July 24, 2000). 
 52.  Id. 
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data that are incompatible with the original purpose of data collection. The Safe 
Harbor principles, in line with the Fair Information Practices discussed earlier, 
also include a right of individual access and correction, data security, limitations 
on use and data transfers, and independent dispute settlement as an enforcement 
mechanism. Firms that wish to invoke Safe Harbor must incorporate these 
principles in their privacy policy, make their privacy policy public and ensure that 
it is readily available to consumers, and self-certify their adherence to Safe Harbor 
on an annual basis with the Department of Commerce.53 Since firms hold 
themselves out as subscribing to the Safe Harbor principles, a violation of the 
principles can be sanctioned by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under its 
powers to bring enforcement actions against unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.54 
There has been considerable debate over the effectiveness of Safe Harbor, both 
as a vehicle for bringing U.S. corporate practices into line with EU law and as a tool 
for safeguarding consumer privacy. In the first years after Safe Harbor came into 
force, relatively few firms signed up, but today over 3,200 have self-certified with 
the Department of Commerce.55 Although a number of observers have called into 
question whether the firms that hold themselves out as complying actually do so, 
the FTC has recently begun taking a more proactive approach to enforcement. The 
well-publicized settlement orders against Google, Facebook, and Myspace all 
included Safe Harbor counts.56 Additionally, the FTC has brought over a dozen 
enforcement actions against firms that claimed Safe Harbor membership but failed 
to renew their self-certification with the Department of Commerce.57 
More broadly, there has been skepticism over whether consent—that is, notice 
and choice—operates as an effective device for safeguarding privacy. This 
skepticism applies not only to Safe Harbor but to U.S. and EU privacy regulation 
broadly speaking, which also rely heavily on consent.58 The privacy notices, which 
describe what will be done with personal information, are unwieldy, 
incomprehensible, and generally go unread by consumers. Even if privacy notices 
were comprehensible and effective disclosure might therefore exist, consumer 
choice is significantly limited by the very expansive interpretation of what uses are 
 
 53.  See id. 
 54.  See id. 
 55.  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of the EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU, 
at 4, COM (2013) 847 final (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Safe Harbor]. 
 56.  Complaint at 8, MySpace LLC, FTC File No. 102 3058, No. C-4369 (F.T.C. Aug. 30, 2012); Complaint 
at 19, Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 092 3184, No. C-4365 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012); Complaint at 7, Google Inc., 
FTC File No. 102 3136, No. C-4336 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011). 
 57.  See orders referenced at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/06/ftc-
approves-final-orders-settling-charges-us-eu-safe-harbor; and orders referenced in www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-approves-final-orders-us-eu-safe-harbor-cases. 
 58.  See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION 
IN THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 343 (Jane I. Winn ed., 2006); WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A 
NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL 
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“compatible” with the original purposes of data collection and the difficulty of 
navigating electronic disclosures to opt out of those uses and third-party transfers 
that are “incompatible.” Furthermore, consumers are generally unable to choose 
among vendors based on their privacy practices because of the absence of 
significant differences in vendor policies. Overall, therefore, as a mode of policy 
coordination and regulatory cooperation in the context of a globalized data 
economy and multiple legal jurisdictions, Safe Harbor has proven quite successful. 
As a device for protecting consumer privacy, however, it has been less effective. 
Policy thinking has evolved considerably since the Safe Harbor agreement was 
negotiated over a decade ago and therefore it might very well be necessary to 
change the principles contained in Safe Harbor to assure adequate safeguards for 
privacy. 
The Safe Harbor agreement has recently been undone for reasons quite 
different from the consumer privacy concerns that originally motivated the 
agreement.59 As revealed by Snowden, U.S. Internet companies afford national 
security agencies extensive access to the personal information of their clients. 
However, the Safe Harbor agreement and the accompanying Commission 
adequacy decision are almost entirely focused on market actors and the privacy 
safeguards that apply when they handle consumer data. The legal instruments 
have virtually nothing to say on the law that applies when the U.S. government 
seeks access to consumer data and whether that law is adequate from the 
perspective of EU law. As a result, as will be discussed at greater length later in this 
article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has found that Safe 
Harbor can no longer be used as a legal basis for data transfers from the EU to the 
U.S.  
2. Regulation of Government Actors: PNR and SWIFT 
Shortly after 9/11, the EU and the United States became mired in a separate 
set of privacy conflicts—U.S. government access to EU airline passenger data and 
EU financial transactions data.60 This set of regulatory conflicts, unlike Safe 
Harbor, involved the public sector, specifically government agencies with 
responsibilities in the field of national security and criminal law. Many of the same 
regulatory differences that triggered the earlier dispute over the private sector 
were on display in this second round—the different definitions of permissible 
personal data processing and the absence, in the United States, of an independent 
enforcement agency—but were somewhat more surprising given the relatively 
robust nature of public sector regulation in the United States. As compared to the 
private sector, there is comprehensive statutory regulation of government 
actors—namely, the Privacy Act—and there exists a constitutional right to privacy 
against intrusive government surveillance. As already discussed, however, U.S. 
constitutional law is largely silent on the right to data privacy and the guarantees 
of U.S. statutory law are limited in the area of national security and law 
 
 59. See infra text accompanying notes 180–82. 
 60.  See generally European versus American Liberty, supra note 34, at 668–74. 
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enforcement, a trend that has been exacerbated by the post-9/11 political climate. 
To understand the contours of this second round of regulatory conflict, it is 
necessary to first address the jurisdictional issue of how the regulation of police 
and national security agencies in the United States came to be part of the EU 
agenda. There are two parts to the answer. First, privacy regulation of the 
government and the market is interrelated, given that the government is a major 
user of personal information collected by private entities. Under the EU Directive 
and Safe Harbor, firms may disclose information to public actors, including law 
enforcement and national security agencies, if required to do so by law.61 In the 
case of European governments, which are subject to a fundamental right to 
personal data protection and to omnibus data-protection laws, the government’s 
collection of personal data must be based on a clear and precise legal authority and 
must respect the proportionality principle. When a non-European state requests 
such information from firms operating within its jurisdiction, and the request is 
not in line with the guarantees of European data-protection law, then the privacy 
safeguards for the data in the foreign jurisdiction might not be considered 
“adequate” In such a case, the data transfer is unlawful under Article 25 of the 
Directive and European authorities are empowered to take action to either block 
such transfers or to negotiate agreements that establish the appropriate 
safeguards in the foreign jurisdiction. The second explanation for the public-sector 
dimension to the U.S.–EU regulatory dispute is more straightforward: the powers 
of the EU have progressively expanded to include police, justice, and 
immigration.62 After the most recent round of treaty amendments contained in the 
Lisbon Treaty, these areas are squarely within the jurisdiction of the EU 
institutions.63 
In response to 9/11, the U.S. government embarked on an aggressive campaign 
to collect, pool, and analyze data with possible national security implications, and 
one of the casualties of this campaign has been a series of transatlantic disputes 
over the personal data of European citizens. The first involved the passenger name 
records (PNR) collected by airlines. After 9/11, the U.S. authorities began 
requiring that all airline carriers submit the PNR data for flights to, from, or 
through the United States. Given the breadth of the U.S. program—the amount of 
information involved, the extensive sharing among government agencies, and the 
unclear privacy safeguards—a number of European air carriers approached the 
European Commission for guidance on how to satisfy their EU Directive obligation 
to safeguard the privacy of data transferred to third countries.64 The significant 
regulatory differences between the EU and the United States—this time in the 
public domain—triggered lengthy negotiations over an agreement that would 
satisfy both security and privacy concerns. The two sides finally reached a deal in 
2004.65 There have been three successive PNR agreements: The original 2004 
 
 61.  See EP and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 19, art. 7(c); Safe Harbor, supra note 55, Annex 1. 
 62.  See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW:  TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 923–56 (5th ed. 2011). 
 63.  See id. at 24–28. 
 64.  Transgovernmental Networks, supra note 20, at 862. 
 65.  Id. at 864–65. 
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agreement; its 2007 replacement; and the agreement currently in force, from 
2012.66 
Especially on the European side, the adequacy of the privacy safeguards 
afforded by the PNR agreements has been and continues to be contested by a 
number of institutional actors, including the European Parliament, the European 
Data Protection Supervisor, and the Article 29 Working Party.67 Compared to Safe 
Harbor, this dispute has festered longer. At least part of this acrimony can be 
attributed to post-9/11 politics and the fairly intransigent stance of successive U.S. 
administrations on security-related matters. 
The terms of cooperation set down under the current EU–U.S. PNR agreement 
cover the familiar privacy categories of transparency, individual access and 
correction, security, enforcement, and proportionality (which includes purpose, 
amount of data collected, sensitive data, retention of data, and data sharing).68 
Before turning to proportionality and enforcement—the two major points of 
transatlantic difference reviewed earlier in this article and the source of most of 
the conflict in the PNR negotiations—it is worthwhile mentioning individual 
access and correction, since it raises issues that have also become prominent in 
the NSA surveillance controversy. European policymakers have long been 
perplexed by the exclusion of non-U.S. persons, that is, persons who are not U.S. 
citizens or legal permanent residents, from coverage under the Privacy Act of 
1974. As will be explained below, this differential treatment of U.S. and EU persons 
has since come to the fore in the context of NSA surveillance because it also marks 
privacy guarantees in the national security domain. The exclusion of non-U.S. 
persons from the Privacy Act is important for the access and correction principle 
because it prevents Europeans from exercising access rights under that legislation. 
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The EU–U.S. agreement, therefore, specifies that the Freedom of Information Act 
is to be used to obtain the information contained in the PNR held by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Returning to proportionality and enforcement, the purposes of PNR data 
processing are limited mostly to preventing and prosecuting terrorist offenses and 
transnational crimes punishable by imprisonment of three years or more. 
Nineteen types of PNR data can be requested, and the transmission from the air 
carrier to DHS occurs via a “push” system, meaning that the carrier transmits the 
required data into DHS’s database.69 The “push” system is designed to reduce the 
risk that irrelevant data will be collected, which can occur when DHS is authorized 
to extract the PNR directly from the carrier’s reservation system through what is 
known as a “pull” system.70 Sensitive data—in the PNR context, often religious 
affiliation revealed by meal preferences—can only be used under exceptional 
circumstances and are generally deleted after thirty days. PNR data are retained 
for fifteen years—five years in an “active” database and ten years in a “dormant” 
database—after which time they are anonymized; if data are used for a specific 
case or investigation they may be retained as long as necessary.71 Sharing this data 
with other domestic government agencies is allowed only for the counterterrorism 
and law enforcement purposes authorized by the agreement and even then, only 
“in support of those cases under examination or investigation.”72 Presumably, 
therefore, sharing does not occur in bulk, but rather only with reference to specific 
individuals or events being investigated. As for enforcement and oversight, the 
DHS Privacy Office is tasked with primary responsibility, but the agreement also 
mentions other “Department Privacy Officers,” the DHS Office of Inspector 
General, the Government Accountability Office, and the United States Congress.73 
In 2006, the second major dispute over privacy regulation of government 
actors emerged, this time over access to and use of financial data. Since 9/11, the 
United States Treasury Department, under a program known as the Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), had been collecting vast quantities of financial 
data on bank transfers and other types of operations from the Belgian private 
entity the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications 
(SWIFT).74 SWIFT is the largest financial telecommunications network in the 
world and is the system used to execute and record most interbank transactions. 
Although it is established in Belgium, it had two operational servers, one in the 
Netherlands and a mirror server in the United States. Because of its presence in 
the United States, SWIFT was subject to the administrative subpoena power of the 
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Department of Treasury, which is authorized to request financial information for 
counterterrorism purposes. But because SWIFT is established in Belgium and the 
vast majority of the data in the U.S. mirror server originated in the EU, SWIFT was 
also clearly subject to European privacy law and the duty under that law to ensure 
that privacy would be respected upon the transfer of that data to third countries. 
In fact, from the beginning, SWIFT knew that it was running the risk of violating 
European privacy law. Because it was prohibited under the terms of the 
administrative subpoena from disclosing the data transfers, SWIFT requested and 
received a “comfort letter” from the Department of Treasury in which the 
Department pledged to support SWIFT in the event that it was later sued by 
foreign governments or third parties. 
When the TFTP was revealed in 2006, the European Parliament and European 
data-protection authorities strongly condemned the U.S. government for secretly 
and indiscriminately collecting the private financial records of millions of 
Europeans. Both the Belgian data-protection authority and the Article 29 Working 
Party found that SWIFT had violated European privacy law.75 The European 
Commission and the U.S. Department of Treasury subsequently entered into 
discussions to assuage European privacy concerns. The result was a number of 
Treasury representations laying out the scope of the privacy guarantees built into 
the TFTP and an agreement allowing an “eminent European person” appointed by 
the Commission to conduct periodic reviews to ensure that Treasury had complied 
with its representations.76 Although this oversight system did indeed result in two 
largely favorable reports to the Commission by the French magistrate Jean-Louis 
Bruguière,77 it was soon taken over by events: SWIFT announced in 2007 that it 
planned to establish a new operating center in Switzerland by 2009 so that intra-
European bank messages could be stored exclusively in Europe.78 It therefore 
became urgent for the U.S. government to reach a deal with the EU to assure 
continued access to European financial transaction data once those data were 
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physically removed from the United States and were therefore no longer subject 
to the U.S. administrative subpoena power. The first agreement, signed in 2009, 
was voted down by the European Parliament largely in reaction to what was 
perceived as a move by the Council and Commission to circumvent the 
Parliament’s new powers in the areas of police and judicial cooperation and 
external relations after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.79 The second EU–
U.S. agreement (TFTP II), signed and ratified in summer 2010, is the agreement 
currently in force.80 
Similar to the PNR agreement, the privacy guarantees in TFTP II can be 
grouped into transparency; individual access and correction; security; 
enforcement; and proportionality, which includes purpose, amount of data 
collected, sensitive data, retention of data, and data sharing. The procedure 
outlined under the agreement requires that the Treasury issue requests for data—
generally categories of data—that are “necessary” for purposes of prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of terrorism or terrorist financing and that 
are “tailored as narrowly as possible to minimise the amount of data requested.”81 
Such requests are issued to SWIFT and to Europol, which must review the request 
for compliance with proportionality before SWIFT can release the data.82 Once the 
Treasury receives the data, it may only conduct individualized searches—not data 
mining—and only when it suspects that the subject in question has a “nexus to 
terrorism or its financing.”83 Although the agreement recognizes a category of 
“sensitive data,” it anticipates that the financial transaction data will rarely, if ever, 
implicate sensitive data; most likely for this reason, the agreement does not specify 
the special precautions that would be taken in the unlikely event that sensitive 
data were generated.84 Retention periods differ for “extracted” and “non-
extracted” data—non-extracted data are to be deleted after five years, whereas 
extracted data can be retained for as long as necessary for the specific 
investigation or prosecution for which they are used.85 The information extracted 
in individualized searches may be shared with other law enforcement and national 
security agencies “for lead purpose only and for the exclusive purpose of the 
investigation, detection, prevention, or prosecution of terrorism or its financing.”86 
Similar to PNR, oversight is entrusted primarily to the Privacy Office, this time in 
the Treasury Department. 
Even more so than the PNR agreement, TFTP II has failed to allay European 
privacy concerns and has been the object of repeated criticism by 
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parliamentarians and European data-protection authorities.87 This can be 
explained by virtue of the sheer volume of personal data entailed and the secretive 
nature of the program. Whereas passenger name records are relatively discrete 
data points, linked to a specific person and flight, the requests made under TFTP 
II are drawn broadly so as to capture possible terrorist financing. Moreover, 
whereas individuals may experience fairly immediate consequences from PNR—
for instance, repeated secondary screening on entry in the United States, which 
may give rise to the access, correction, and oversight procedures outlined in the 
agreement—the financial data used in TFTP will generally only trigger visible 
government action when the individual is apprehended or prosecuted, making 
those provisions largely theoretical. Finally, transparency is particularly 
challenging in the TFTP context: the Treasury has argued that the effectiveness of 
the program would be undermined by the disclosure of the terms used to extract 
the data or the number of investigations supported by the financial data.88 
To conclude this discussion, it is important to note one element of transatlantic 
privacy conflicts in the public sector that sets them off from conflicts involving 
market regulation. As Henry Farrell and Abe Newman have argued, the U.S.–EU 
disputes over PNR and TFTP have not only set the EU against the United States but 
have exposed divisions between institutional actors within the EU.89 Ministries of 
Home Affairs, represented on the Council, and representatives of the more 
conservative political groups in the European Parliament, such as the European 
People’s Party, have generally been more favorable to sharing data with the United 
States than data-protection authorities and liberal and left-leaning 
parliamentarians. Moreover, these pro-security actors have used U.S.–EU 
negotiations over PNR and TFTP to leverage more extensive powers for their own 
police and intelligence agencies: both PNR and TFTP II include provisions on 
reciprocity that require the U.S. authorities to share the data generated by the PNR 
and TFTP programs with their European counterparts.90 Furthermore, PNR and 
TFTP II have served as a springboard for similar intra-European data-sharing 
programs.91 These transatlantic disputes, therefore, both have exposed the 
conflicting positions of privacy and security advocates within the EU and have 
offered an opportunity for pro-security actors to enhance the EU’s law 
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enforcement and national security capabilities. 
III 
NSA SURVEILLANCE 
The latest chapter in the history of transatlantic disputes over data privacy 
began in 2013 with the Edward Snowden leaks of massive NSA surveillance. As 
with PNR and SWIFT, the EU–U.S. controversy concerns the activities of 
government agencies responsible for national security, but the immense scale of 
the NSA programs makes the other two seem fairly inconsequential by 
comparison. More than the previous episodes, the NSA’s activities have exposed 
rifts not only between the two sides of the Atlantic, but also within Europe, 
between security agencies and privacy institutions and between the actual 
practice of state security and the formal legal requirements and fundamental 
rights that are supposedly applicable against all state actors. As the European 
public learned from the Snowden leaks, the NSA has been routinely assisted by its 
counterparts in the United Kingdom, France, and other European countries even 
though many of the surveillance programs squarely implicate the European right 
to personal data protection. This part considers the implications of the NSA 
disclosure both for transatlantic relations and for the future evolution of EU 
privacy regulation. 
A. European Perspectives on the Snowden Leaks 
Much is unknown about the programs of mass surveillance carried out by the 
NSA and its European counterparts in the last decade. Western governments have 
frequently resorted to the state secrecy doctrine to maintain a veil of ignorance 
over the general features of intelligence programs.92 However, as a result of the 
Snowden leaks and the official and unofficial disclosures that ensued, a series of 
basic facts have been clarified and can be assumed uncontroversial.93 Although the 
leaks concerned a truly spectacular array of surveillance activities, attention has 
focused on two in particular: One program, conducted under Section 215 of the 
Patriot Act, which collects the call records of virtually every American;94 and 
another, conducted under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
which is targeted at foreigners and has as a result been the main focus of European 
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criticism.95 
Under Section 702, the U.S. government is authorized to target for surveillance 
“non-US persons,” that is, not U.S. citizens or permanent residents, who are 
“reasonably believed to be located outside the United States,” in order “to acquire 
foreign intelligence information.”96 Unlike traditional foreign intelligence 
surveillance, the U.S. government need only certify the believed identity and 
location of the target; it is not required to show probable cause that the person is 
a lone-wolf terrorist or an agent of a foreign power.97  The NSA uses Section 702 
to engage in two main types of electronic surveillance and bulk data collection. 
First, with PRISM collection, the government obtains content and metadata from 
Internet companies related to a “selector,” such as an e-mail address.98 The kind of 
information varies by provider and can include e-mails, videos, social networking 
details, and more. Second, with “upstream collection,” the government compels the 
assistance of the providers that control the telecommunications backbone over 
which communications transmit. Through this device, the government intercepts 
communications directly, again based on a “selector.”99 Upstream collection, 
unlike PRISM, can include the content of telephone conversations. In addition to 
these and similar programs, information has recently surfaced that the NSA, 
independently or in cooperation with foreign services, mainly the United Kingdom 
Government Communications Headquarters, has engaged in surveillance of EU 
institutions, member state embassies, and foreign leaders.100 One example is the 
much-discussed interception of Chancellor Merkel’s telephone communications. 
Civil society actors, journalists, human rights nongovernmental organizations, 
ordinary citizens, and others were outraged to learn of the scale and nature of the 
surveillance programs. In contrast, the reaction of European governments was 
mixed. On one hand, they repeatedly voiced their strong objections to the U.S. 
authorities, as in the case of the alleged wiretapping of Chancellor Merkel’s 
telephone;101 on the other hand, they failed to address head-on the leaked 
information that implicated European intelligence agencies.102 Indeed, in contrast 
with the United States, which has openly admitted the existence of the NSA 
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programs and has confirmed their main features, the member states have so far 
failed to give detailed explanations of their surveillance programs and have 
maintained the classified status of most of the relevant documents.103 
The Snowden leaks and the journalistic and parliamentary inquiries that have 
been conducted to date unequivocally demonstrate that several European 
intelligence agencies have actively participated in the implementation of the NSA 
programs and have themselves collected a vast amount of data and information 
subsequently made available, generally on the basis of reciprocity, to their foreign 
counterparts.104 In particular, the United Kingdom has cooperated closely with the 
NSA, setting up an extremely powerful system of large-scale surveillance.105 
According to some allegations, it seems also that the GCHQ infiltrated the Belgian 
communication provider Belgacom to collect data on European institutions.106 
Such activities are not to be explained only on the basis of the long-lasting U.K.–
U.S. relationship in the field of intelligence—a relationship that is also backed by a 
substantial financial contribution from the Unites States to GCHQ.107 Instead, there 
is sufficient evidence that the agencies of other European countries, such as 
Germany, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands, have carried out similar mass-
surveillance programs. Among such programs are the direct control of 
communications nodes known as “upstreaming,” systematic access to private-
sector data, and the use of decryption software.108 
The scale and technological sophistication of these programs are probably not 
comparable to the U.S. surveillance programs. There is no doubt, however, that 
mass surveillance of communications has been carried out by European agencies, 
and that in most cases a vast amount of personal data—content data and 
metadata—has been made available to their U.S. counterparts.109 From a European 
perspective, therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that mass surveillance is by 
no means a solely U.S. issue. It also raises the question, again from a European 
viewpoint, of the legal basis and legitimacy of both the EU and U.S. surveillance 
operations, discussed next. 
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B. The Lawfulness of U.S. Surveillance 
The Section 702 program has attracted significant criticism in Europe. As 
discussed earlier in the analysis of PNR and TFTP II, there are several different 
types of privacy guarantees generally believed to be important under European 
law: transparency, individual access and correction, accuracy, security, oversight, 
and proportionality. As in the earlier transatlantic privacy disputes, the European 
reaction has been partly driven by the argument that these standards have not 
been met. It is obviously impossible and undesirable to ensure complete 
transparency, individual access and correction, and oversight in the area of 
intelligence gathering, but the degree of freedom afforded to surveillance actors 
under the Section 702 program has been a source of puzzlement. 
Consider first the European constitutional requirement of a basis in law for any 
infringement of the right to personal data protection. Although the current version 
of the Section 702 program is conducted, unlike earlier versions,  pursuant to a 
congressional law that sets down different substantive and procedural criteria, the 
type of personal information that may be gathered—foreign intelligence 
information involving non-U.S. persons located outside of the United States is not 
clearly defined.110 As noted in the report of the EU Data Protection Working Party, 
“foreign intelligence could, on the face of the provision, include information 
concerning the political activities of individuals or groups, or activities of 
government agencies, where such activity could be of interest to the United States 
for its foreign policy.”111 It could also include activities relevant to U.S. economic 
interests.112 The U.S. government, questioned on the exact scope of the notion, 
refused to give a detailed answer on the grounds that this would compromise the 
efficacy of intelligence activities.113 Moreover, FISA contains no limitation on the 
geographical reach of the surveillance, and it therefore could, in principle, cover 
not only the operations of service providers in the United States, but also data 
stored in the cloud and data processed by subsidiaries of U.S. companies located 
in the EU. 
Turning to the safeguards afforded by judicial oversight, at first blush they 
appear substantial when compared with Europe’s corresponding judicial 
safeguards. In many European systems, oversight is conducted by special 
parliamentary committees or executive bodies, and does not contemplate a role 
for the courts. By contrast, under FISA, a special court comprised of ordinary 
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judges (the FISA Court) supervises intelligence surveillance. In the context of 
Section 702, however, the powers of the FISA Court are relatively limited: it only 
approves the type of foreign intelligence information being collected, the targeting 
procedures used by the NSA to conclude that surveillance will lead to the 
acquisition of foreign intelligence information on a non-U.S. person outside of the 
United States, and the minimization procedures used to prevent the collection and 
use of information on U.S. persons.114 In contrast with traditional FISA 
surveillance, the FISA Court does not review applications for the surveillance of 
specific individuals.115 Furthermore, the FISA Court’s orders are classified and 
companies that are required to cooperate with the NSA, under the authority of the 
orders, are bound to secrecy. As a result, there is no way for data subjects to be 
informed that their personal data are being collected or processed.116 Relatedly, 
individuals have no right to obtain access, rectification, or erasure of data, and the 
prospect of administrative or judicial redress is virtually nonexistent. The 
difficulty of obtaining a judicial remedy, absent a criminal prosecution based on 
unlawfully acquired evidence, was confirmed in Clapper v. Amnesty International 
USA.117 In that case, the Supreme Court found that the petitioners—human rights 
lawyers and others who communicated with clients abroad—did not have 
standing because the claim that their telephone communications were likely to be 
intercepted was “too speculative.”118 
NSA surveillance has also raised proportionality issues familiar from the 
previous rounds of transatlantic conflict. One feature of the surveillance programs 
that has attracted much attention is the lack of protection for metadata.119 In the 
context of the Section 215 call records program, the U.S. government has 
confirmed that the NSA collects call metadata from all major telecommunications 
companies and maintains a database of all such calls for five years.120 This is done 
irrespective of the safeguards formally set forth by the Fourth Amendment—
judicial warrant and probable cause—but consistent with the interpretation given 
by the Supreme Court in the 1970s, according to which there is no “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” for personal data entrusted to a third party.121 As explained 
at the beginning of this article, the EU takes the opposite approach: metadata is 
considered “personal data” and therefore must be collected and processed 
according to the general principles of data-protection law. 122  Another anomaly 
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with respect to European law is how privacy principles are applied to bulk 
collection. The U.S. intelligence community takes the position that the acquisition 
of personal data does not amount, in and of itself, to “processing”; data are 
processed only at the moment when they are analyzed by a human being.123 In 
other words, the default position in U.S. national security law is that privacy 
concerns arise only when the information is accessed by a human being. This view 
stands in contrast with European law, under which the right to personal data-
protection is triggered at the moment of collection, and facilitates more extensive 
bulk collection than is contemplated under European law. 
In addition to these well-known transatlantic differences, the Snowden leaks 
have introduced a new bone of contention in transatlantic privacy relations—the 
dramatic difference in U.S. law between the treatment of citizens and non-citizens. 
Even more than PNR and TFTP, the NSA programs have brought into sharp focus 
the two-track scheme that runs throughout U.S. privacy law and that results in 
relatively few guarantees for EU citizens.124 This is particularly apparent under 
Section 702.125 The surveillance authorized under Section 702 is directed at 
foreign citizens who are not legal residents and who are believed to be located 
outside the United States.126 A corollary of this basic mission is that most of the 
limitations contained in Section 702 seek to protect U.S. persons from being swept 
up in foreign intelligence surveillance.127 The targeting and minimization 
procedures subject to the approval of the FISA Court are aimed at protecting the 
privacy of U.S. persons, not foreign citizens. This two-track scheme also marks U.S. 
constitutional law. All government surveillance must respect the privacy 
guarantees contained in the Fourth Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held 
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to nonresident aliens located 
abroad.128  In other words, most of the EU citizens implicated by NSA surveillance 
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have no privacy rights under the U.S. Constitution. 
To be fair, many, if not most, countries operate with surveillance laws that 
afford heightened privacy protections to their own citizens. For example, German 
law authorizes its intelligence services to carry out surveillance only on 
telecommunications connections that are not regularly used by German citizens, 
thereby treating non-Germans less favorably.129 What is more exceptional is the 
denial of any human rights protection for foreigners. Many constitutions and 
international treaties—including Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the United States is party—protect privacy 
as a human right vested in all persons.130 Thus the constitutional jurisprudence of 
countries like Germany does not draw a categorical difference between the rights 
afforded to citizens and foreigners. A number of European commentators have 
argued that because the United States permits the virtually unrestricted 
surveillance of the communications of foreigners located outside of its territory, it 
violates its human rights obligations under the ICCPR.131 
The extraterritorial application of human rights treaties is a controversial issue 
and it is not easy to predict how it will be resolved in the field of mass 
surveillance.132 On this scope issue, however, as on the substance of privacy rights, 
there are significant differences between the United States and Europe. The United 
States has traditionally argued that under the ICCPR states are only responsible 
for human rights violations on their own territory, not extraterritorially.133 By 
contrast, the European approach is somewhat more flexible. The European 
Convention of Human Rights, which is framed in different terms than the ICCPR, 
has been applied by the ECtHR and the Commission of Human Rights in cases of 
extraterritorial violations of human rights.134 To avoid irrational or unfeasible 
results, the ECtHR has limited the obligation of the member states to respect the 
rights guaranteed by the Convention to two main situations: First, the spatial 
model, which is the de facto effective control over an area;135 and second, the 
personal jurisdiction model, or the exercise of authority and control over an 
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individual.136 If such jurisdictional criteria are satisfied, then a state in question 
may be answerable even for extraterritorial violations. 
The ECtHR’s approach to extraterritoriality has been developed mainly 
regarding cases concerning the infringement of the right to life, liberty, and 
personal integrity.137 Applying it to interferences with privacy is a difficult task, 
largely because such interferences are typically incorporeal and do not require the 
exercise of physical powers over the person. To gain traction over the issue, it is 
useful to distinguish, following a suggestion by Marko Milanovic,  among three 
different factual scenarios: (1) The surveillance is carried out on the state’s own 
territory and the target is located inside the national borders; (2) the surveillance 
is carried out, or the resulting data are processed, on the state’s own territory but 
the target is located abroad;138 and (3) the person is located abroad and the 
interference with privacy takes place outside the state’s own territory. Under the 
ECtHR’s spatial model of jurisdiction, one could argue that both the first and 
second scenarios justify the application of the Convention.139  
The third situation is more problematic because it is not covered by the spatial 
model, and even under the personal model, it is not clear whether the interception 
of communications or the bulk collection of metadata would qualify as an exercise 
of “authority or control” over an individual. Milanovic has recently argued that the 
right to privacy under the ECHR should be applied extraterritorially in this third 
situation as well, noting that it would be irrational to treat differently factual 
situations that involve the same set of substantive problems.140 The interferences 
with privacy under the Section 702 program, however, do not appear to trigger 
this more complex scenario but rather seem to fall under the second scenario, 
given that both PRISM collection and upstream collection take place on U.S. 
territory.141 One could argue, therefore, that if personal data of European citizens 
are collected and processed by the NSA without complying with the procedural 
and substantive requirements of Article 17 of the ICCPR, the overall situation 
would be highly asymmetrical: American citizens would be protected by Article 8 
of the European Convention of Human Rights (with respect to surveillance carried 
out by European intelligence and police authorities), whereas Europeans would 
not enjoy similar guarantees vis-à-vis  surveillance by U.S. authorities. 
In addition to the discriminatory application of privacy rights, another novel 
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element of the current transatlantic dispute involves the methods that have been 
used by the NSA to gather intelligence on Europeans. The first part of this article 
described two official channels through which the U.S. government can obtain 
personal data on Europeans—pursuant to the PNR agreement and to the TFTP II 
agreement. There also exists the Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement between the 
EU and United States, which makes it possible, under certain conditions, to gather 
and exchange data for the prevention and investigation of criminal activities, 
including international terrorism.142 In the eyes of some European commentators, 
the U.S. authorities have deliberately circumvented these official channels by 
collecting data directly from private service providers, an action they claim might 
even amount to a violation of international law. 
C. The Lawfulness of European Surveillance 
As mentioned above, according to initial reports, it appears that some of the 
largest European intelligence agencies, including those of England, France, and 
Germany, have actively cooperated with the NSA and have collected and probably 
exchanged large amounts of personal data on European citizens, including many 
who have never been the object of a counterterrorism or criminal investigation.143 
This has revealed the rift, discussed earlier in the context of PNR and TFTP II, 
between different European actors. Although data-protection authorities and 
certain liberal political parties have championed privacy rights,144 they have 
always met with powerful resistance from the forces of law and order, and in 
particular, the national security establishment. The allegations of mass data 
collection and processing by European intelligence services also raise the question 
of whether a gap exists between the law on the books and the actual operation of 
state activities: Have the principles of European data-protection law been 
violated? Various complaints have already been lodged both before national and 
supranational courts,145 but even at this early stage it is possible to clarify some 
general points. 
At the outset, it should be noted that the legal framework governing the various 
intelligence programs is highly fragmented. As a policy area, national security falls 
outside the competences of the EU and is reserved for the member states.146 The 
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laws regulating the powers, internal organization, and responsibilities of 
intelligence and security agencies, as well as oversight mechanisms, tend to vary 
significantly among different European countries.147 
Notwithstanding this diversity, a number of general principles can be derived 
from the European constitutional framework and from the harmonized European 
law of data protection. Because the European Convention on Human Rights 
governs all the activities of European states, including national security 
surveillance, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is the most clearly applicable body of 
law. As explained earlier, the right to privacy under Article 8 of the Convention is 
triggered whenever public or private bodies gather information that can be 
associated with a person. For processing to be lawful, there must be a basis in law, 
a clearly defined purpose set down in that law, and proportionality. The Court has 
adapted these general requirements to the specific context of surveillance by 
national intelligence services in what, by now, constitutes a fairly substantial line 
of jurisprudence. 
First, in the 1978 case of Klass and Others v. Germany,148 the Court held that any 
person whose communications are likely being monitored under a secret 
intelligence program, even if it cannot be shown that he or she was actually a 
victim of surveillance, has standing to sue.149 In other words, an application is 
considered admissible even in the absence of concrete evidence of harm. As the 
Court observed in Weber and Saravia v. Germany: 
[T]he mere existence of legislation which allows a system for the secret monitoring of 
communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation may 
be applied. This threat necessarily strikes at freedom of communication between users 
of the telecommunications services, and thereby amounts to an interference with the 
exercise of the applicants’ rights under Article 8, irrespective of any measures actually 
taken against them.150 
This relatively permissive test for obtaining standing contrasts with the United 
States Supreme Court’s position, affirmed in Clapper, that the mere threat of 
surveillance does not establish standing.151 
Once the Court finds that the surveillance in question amounts to an 
interference with the right to privacy under Article 8, it examines whether the 
interference is provided for by the law and is necessary in a democratic society to 
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achieve the aims mentioned in Article 8 (2) of the Convention.152 Roughly 
speaking, “provided for by law” maps onto the legal basis and purpose 
requirements discussed in the first part of this article, whereas “necessary in a 
democratic society” tracks this article’s proportionality analysis. 
In the context of intelligence operations, the Court has repeatedly stated that 
the “law” authorizing secret surveillance programs must “be accessible to the 
person concerned, who must, moreover, be able to foresee its consequences for him, 
and compatible with the rule of law.”153 To understand the Court’s jurisprudence, 
it is useful to reproduce in full the following passage on foreseeability, applicable 
both to the interception of individual communications and to mass electronic 
surveillance programs: 
[F]oreseeability in the special context of secret measures of surveillance, such as the 
interception of communications, cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee 
when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can adapt his 
conduct accordingly . . . [h]owever, especially where a power vested in the executive is 
exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident . . . [i]t is therefore essential to 
have clear, detailed rules on interception of telephone conversations, especially as the 
technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated . . . . The domestic 
law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the 
circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to 
resort to any such measures . . . . [T]he law must indicate the scope of any such discretion 
conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity 
to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference. In its case-law on 
secret measures of surveillance, the Court has developed the following minimum 
safeguards that should be set out in statute law in order to avoid abuses of power: the 
nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of the 
categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of 
telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data 
obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and 
the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed.154 
Applying this jurisprudence on the “law” required to authorize the interference 
with the privacy right, the ECtHR held against the United Kingdom in Liberty v. The 
United Kingdom.155 The Strasbourg Court found that the 1985 Act authorizing the 
interception of communications passing between the United Kingdom and an 
external receiver violated Article 8 for the following three reasons: (1) There was 
no limit on the type of external communications that could be included in a 
warrant; (2) the Act allowed the State authorities broad discretion on the question 
of which communications, out of the total volume of those physically captured, 
would be read or listened to; and( 3) the procedures to be followed in selecting 
specific communications for examination, sharing, storing, and destroying were 
not set out in a manner accessible to the public.156 A similar conclusion was 
reached in the subsequent case of Iordachi v. Moldova.157 
Moving to the second part of the inquiry—whether the interference is 
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necessary in a democratic society—the Strasbourg Court has repeatedly affirmed 
that secret surveillance measures, although seriously interfering with the right to 
respect of private life, may be considered admissible insofar as they are aimed at 
protecting national security.158 The member states, however, are not allowed 
unlimited discretion in designing such programs: “in view of the risk that a system 
of secret surveillance for the protection of national security may undermine or 
even destroy democracy under the cloak of defending it,” governments are 
required to put in place “adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.”159 With 
this requirement, the Court imposes a classic proportionality test, which must take 
into consideration “all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and 
duration of the possible measures; the grounds required for ordering them; the 
authorities competent to authorize, carry out and supervise them; and the kind of 
remedy provided by the national law.”160 
To illustrate the application of these principles, in the case of Weber and Others 
v. Germany, the ECtHR came to the conclusion that the German program that 
permitted the wiretapping of international telephone calls for purposes of 
counterterrorism, the so-called G-10 Act, as modified by the Fight against Crime 
Act of 28 October 1994,161 satisfied both of Article 8’s requirements of “law” and 
being “necessary in a democratic society.” The law defined in a clear and precise 
manner the offenses that could give rise to an interception order, the duration of 
the interception, the categories of persons likely to be intercepted, the maximum 
duration of monitoring measures, the procedure to be followed for examining and 
using the data, and the circumstances in which recordings could be erased or tapes 
destroyed.162 
An analysis of TEMPORA, one of the most intrusive and sophisticated of the 
national security programs revealed by Snowden, sheds light on how these 
principles might be applied to mass surveillance. There are two primary 
components to the program. First, it appears that the GCHQ has been allowed to 
access, in secret and without controls, the personal data pertaining to U.K. citizens 
gathered by the NSA under the Section 702 program.163 If this is confirmed, then 
such an activity would amount to a circumvention of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which requires the government to adopt specified 
safeguards when intercepting communications of individuals located in the United 
Kingdom. Without a detailed and accessible legal basis, and in the absence of any 
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“adequate and effective guarantee against abuse,”164 it is difficult to see how such 
an interference with private life could be considered legitimate by the Strasbourg 
Court. Second, it has been reported that the GCHQ has intercepted more than 200 
fiber optic cables landing in the United Kingdom, storing and extracting data 
related to “external communications” of primarily non-U.K. citizens. The 
intercepted communications include both the content and metadata of telephone 
calls and internet traffic, such as e-mails, Facebook entries, and Google searches. 
Although authorized under certificated warrants issued pursuant to section 8(4) 
of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, this surveillance seems to be 
disproportionate insofar as the bulk interception of communications on a 
continuous and indiscriminate basis comprises blanket surveillance of thousands 
and possibly of millions of people.165 Additionally, U.S. officials have allegedly been 
granted extensive access to this data, again in the absence of a clear and 
transparent legal basis.166 
Will the European courts rule against the mass surveillance programs carried 
out by several national agencies, allegedly in collaboration with the NSA? Although 
it is hard to tell at the moment, some indications suggest that they might. In 2013, 
the ECtHR, following a preliminary examination of its admissibility, decided to give 
priority, under rule 41, to the application lodged by Big Brother Watch and Others 
(a coalition of nongovernmental organizations engaged with the protection of 
privacy and other civil liberties) against the United Kingdom.167 The applicants 
have complained that the TEMPORA program, analyzed above, has no adequate 
basis in domestic law and is not proportionate under Article 8 of the Convention.168 
The Court of Justice of the European Union has also recently taken a more 
categorical approach to privacy. Since the Snowden revelations, the Court has 
decided three important data-protection cases: Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister of 
Communications Ireland and others,169 Google Spain v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos and Mario Costeja González,170 and Schrems v. Data Protection 
Commissioner.171 All bear witness to the Court’s hardening stance on the right to 
personal data protection.The judgments also demonstrate considerable attention 
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to the extraterritorial dimension of the policy problem and the challenges of 
safeguarding the right in the face of market and government surveillance that 
occurs within other jurisidictions, particularly the United States.  And lurking in 
the background, or in the case of Schrems, squarely on the face of the judgment, is 
the deeply troubling policy problem that has been brought to the fore by the 
Snowden revelations: How can privacy be protected in the face of unprecedented 
advances in digital technologies, the growing concentration of power and personal 
data in the hands of market actors, and the seemingly unlimited appetite for that 
data among law enforcement, national security, and other government actors?172 
 On April 8, 2014, in Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister of Communications 
Ireland and others, the CJEU found that Directive 2006/24/EC was invalid.173 The 
so-called Data Retention Directive required electronic communication providers 
to collect and retain all traffic and location data of all their clients concerning fixed 
telephony, mobile telephony, Internet access, Internet e-mail and Internet 
telephony for a period between six months and two years. These metadata were 
to be made available “for the purpose of the investigation, detection and 
prosecution of serious crime.”174 The CJEU found the Directive incompatible with 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
which respectively enshrine the right to privacy and the right to personal data 
protection. 
 In Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU reasoned that the interference with 
privacy was particularly serious because of the huge quantity and type of data 
involved, together with the fact that the data were retained and subsequently used 
without any knowledge of the data subject. In the view of the CJEU, the data-
retention requirement was “likely to generate in the minds of the persons 
concerned the feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant 
surveillance.”175 In the judgment, the CJEU acknowledged that the objectives of the 
Directive were of the utmost importance, being related to the fight against 
organized crime and terrorism176 but found that the interference with privacy was 
not proportionate to the legitimate aims being pursued. To reach this conclusion, 
the Court assigned particular relevance to the following elements: (1) The data 
retention program applied to all persons without limitations, and even to persons 
“for whom there is no evidence capable of suggesting that their conduct might 
have a link, even an indirect or remote one, with serious crime;” (2) the program 
covered all data, irrespective of any relationship between such data and a threat 
to public security; (3) the Directive set down no substantive and procedural 
conditions to regulate access to and use of the data by the competent national 
authorities; (4) such access was not made dependent “on a prior review carried 
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out by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision seeks to 
limit access to the data and their use to what is strictly necessary;” and (5) the 
retention period was fixed in general terms, between six months and two years, 
without a distinction being made among the different types of data and without 
employing criteria designed to guarantee that the retention period be limited to 
what was strictly necessary in light of the aims pursued.177 
The CJEU also pointed to another flaw in the Data Retention Directive: it did 
not prohibit the retention of the metadata outside of the European Union, 
with the result that it cannot be held that the control, explicitly required by Article 8(3) 
of the Charter, by an independent authority of compliance with the requirements of 
protection and security, as referred to in the two previous paragraphs, is fully ensured. 
Such a control, carried out on the basis of EU law, is an essential component of the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.178 
The danger alluded to—transferring data to less privacy-protective 
jurisdictions—could be very well be interpreted as a specific reference to NSA 
surveillance.  
 Only one month after Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU handed down its 
judgment in Google Spain.  There the CJEU found Google liable for violating the so-
called right-to-be-forgotten in the EU Data Protection Directive. 179  That right is 
linked to the right of individual access and correction, discussed earlier in this 
article, and requires that firms like Google expunge from their computer systems 
personal information that fails to comply with data-protection standards such as 
accuracy and proportionality. In a critical part of the judgment, the Court found in 
favor of broad territorial application of the EU Directive to ensure that European 
data-protection rights could not be circumvented by processing personal data 
outside the EU.180 Even though Google argued that the EU Directive was not 
applicable because all the data processing connected with its search engine 
occurred in the the United States, the CJEU found that a corporate presence in the 
EU for purposes of selling advertising space was enough to bring Google within the 
territorial scope of the Directive.  
 The last in this trilogy of data-protection cases is Schrems v. Data Protection 
Commissioner.  In the wake of the NSA scandal, an Austrian citizen and subscriber 
of Facebook, Maximilian Schrems, lodged a complaint before the Irish Data 
Protection Commissioner. He claimed that Facebook Ireland systematically 
transferred the data of its European customers to Facebook USA’s servers in the 
United States, where they were stored.  Facebook was a participant in the Safe 
Harbor program and therefore, as explained earlier in this article, was entitled to 
a finding of adequacy for purposes of satisfying the requirements of the EU Data 
Protection Directive on data transfers to third countries. Schrems, however, relied 
on the Snowden revelations of Facebook’s involvement in the PRISM program 
(which allows the NSA access to the data of EU citizens held by Internet 
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companies) to argue that the transfers violated the substantive and procedural 
guarantees of the Directive and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Articles 7 and 8).  When the Data Protection Commissioner refused to take action, 
Schrems challenged the Commissioner’s decision in Irish court, which in turn 
referred the issue to the CJEU.   
 The CJEU held in favor of Schrems, against Safe Harbor. Although the 
judgment touches on a number of issues, the most important one for purposes of 
this article is the question of whether adherence to the Safe Harbor principles 
guarantees the adequacy of data protection for European data transferred to the 
United States.  The Court’s answer was a resounding “No.”  The Court faulted the 
Safe Harbor agreement and the accompanying Commission decision on adequacy 
for including a broad exception for U.S. government access to personal data based 
on “national security, public interest, or law enforcement requirements” or based 
on “statute, government regulation, or case-law.”181 In assessing adequacy, the 
Commission had focused exclusively on the private sector and had failed to assess 
whether the legal standards applicable to government actors were comparable to 
those under EU data-protection law.182  
 After pointing out these flaws in the Commission’s decision, the Court set 
down the criteria that would have to be satisfied for the United States to be 
considered an adequate jurisdiction.  These criteria are grounded on the legal basis 
and purpose, as well as proportionality, requirements that have been central to 
this area of constitutional law since the early 1970s and that have already been 
discussed in the context of the German Constitutional Court and the ECtHR.  The 
Court found that indiscriminate access to electronic data, in particular the content 
of communications, would violate the essence of the right to privacy.  Any law 
serving as the basis for a interference with the right to privacy would have to 
include “objective criterion . . . to determine the limits of the access of the public 
authorities to the data, and of its subsequent use, for purposes which are specific, 
strictly restricted and capable of justifying the interference.”183 In addition, the 
right of access, correction, and in some cases, erasure, would have to be 
enforceable through the courts.184 Since the Commission made no such findings, 
the Court held that the Safe Harbor adequacy determination was invalid.   
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The revelations of NSA surveillance are but the last, albeit perhaps the most 
dramatic, episode in transatlantic privacy regulation. Whatever one might think of 
the NSA programs, they have undoubtedly had repercussions for privacy and 
transatlantic relations more broadly speaking. In July 2013, the European 
Parliament passed a Resolution calling for an official investigation into the NSA 
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programs and instructed its Parliamentary Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, 
and Home Affairs to conduct an in-depth inquiry into the matter.185 After six 
months of intense activity, on January 8, 2014, the Rapporteur Claude Moraes 
published a Draft Report that called for a Parliament Resolution condemning the 
programs of indiscriminate surveillance of citizens and proposing a complex 
package of reforms aimed at improving privacy safeguards.186 The Report, 
approved by the European Parliament on March 12, 2014, demonstrates the 
climate of distrust created by the NSA programs. This climate has compromised 
some of the arduous efforts of the past decades to overcome regulatory differences 
and create a harmonized privacy scheme to facilitate transatlantic trade and to 
improve cooperation on security and law enforcement. The Parliament Report 
called for immediate suspension of Safe Harbor and, as discussed above, a year 
later, the Court of Justice invalidated the Commission decision granting “adequate” 
data-protection status to those U.S. firms that subscribe to the Safe Harbor 
principles. Even earlier, in October 2013, the Parliament passed a resolution 
advocating suspension of TFTP II. 
There have also been consequences for transatlantic trade relations more 
broadly speaking. The 2014 Parliament Report called for the suspension of the 
negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement 
until the conclusion of negotiations on a transatlantic “Umbrella Agreement” 
setting down data-protection guarantees for personal information exchanged for 
law enforcement purposes.187 Although Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership Agreement negotiations have gone forward, there is currently a 
significant push to also conclude the Umbrella Agreement, without which it is 
unlikely that the European Parliament will ratify any trade deal at all.  One of the 
biggest hurdles to finalizing and ratifying the Umbrella Agreement is the double 
standard for U.S. citizens and EU citizens in U.S. law, a double standard that has 
been particularly evident in the operation of the Section 702 program. 
It would be misleading to portray the European reaction to the Snowden leaks 
as unequivocally hostile. The member states and their governments, individually 
and through the Council of Ministers, have been fairly silent. Moreover, there have 
been numerous attempts by interior ministers and their supporters to enhance 
EU-wide surveillance in the interest of fighting the threat of extremism and 
terrorism. For instance, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, has 
recently urged the European Parliament to pass a longstanding proposal for an EU 
 
 185.  Resolution of 4 July 2013 on the US National Security Agency Surveillance Program, Surveillance 
Bodies in Various Member States and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Privacy, 2013/2682 (RSP) (2013), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0322&language=EN. 
 186.  All the relevant documents are collected in LIBE COMMITTEE INQUIRY, ELECTRONIC MASS 
SURVEILLANCE OF EU CITIZENS: PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN A DIGITAL AGE (2013–2014), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201410/20141016ATT91322/20141016AT
T91322EN.pdf. 
 187.  Draft Report on the US NSA Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various Member States 
and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Fundamental Rights and on Transatlantic Cooperation in Justice and Home 
Affairs (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-526.085+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN. 
 134 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol.78:4 
PNR that would mimic the system in place in the United States.188 What can be said, 
however, is that the vigorous transatlantic debate on privacy can contribute to 
protecting both sides from complacency. There is no doubt that personal data 
processing can produce, both in the market and the surveillance contexts, 
significant benefits. There is also no question that robust privacy guarantees are 
necessary and the transatlantic debate has had a positive impact on privacy. As 
with many policy issues, the debate on privacy is somewhat lopsided and the 
regulatory actors most directly impacted can sometimes use the ebb and flow of 
public attention to avoid institutional reform.189 As public outrage over the 
Snowden affair fades and government and corporate actors seek to strategically 
delay—and perhaps avoid—legal change, the existence of a symbolic set of 
fundamental rights and a vocal set of watchdogs in Europe can help sustain 
attention to the policy problem and keep privacy reform on the public agenda. 
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